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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1965 the Supreme Court made clear that state prosecutors were
virtually free to exercise peremptory challenges to remove blacks from
criminal juries for no reason other than their race.' Roughly twenty
years later the Supreme Court changed its mind: "The core guarantee
of equal protection . . . would be meaningless were we to approve the
exclusion of jurors on the basis of such assumptions [of bias], which
arise solely from the jurors' race."2
The right to counsel experienced a similar reversal of fortune.
About fifty years ago the Court decided that "fundamental fairness"
and a "universal sense of justice" did not require the state to provide
* A.B., University of Chicago, 1978, J.D., Georgetown University, 1982. 1 would like to thank
Ann AIthouse, Vivian Berger, Erwin Chemerinsky, Graham Hughes, Nancy King, and Larry
Yackle for taking the time to read an earlier draft and share their suggestions with me. I also
would like to thank Lisa Collins for her research assistance.
1. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212 (1965). Swain established an almost impossible bur-
den for one seeking any redress for discriminatory peremptory strikes; subsequent to Swain relief
was seldom available. Jon M. Van Dyke, Jury Selection Procedures: Our Uncertain Commitment
to Representative Panels 151 (Ballinger, 1977).
2. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97-98 (1986).
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counsel to one accused of a felony.3 Some twenty years later the Court
recanted: "[R]eason and reflection require us to recognize that in our
adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is
too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is
provided for him.'4
The right to counsel and the right to freedom from discriminatory
peremptory challenges are not unique. The same evolution has been ev-
ident with regard to the right to a jury trial,5 the right to be free from
compelled self-incrimination,6 and, indeed, virtually all of the rights
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights and the due process clause. 7 Admit-
tedly, the decades between 1950 and 1980 witnessed sea changes in the
interpretations of those rights. But contrary to the views of some,' due
process always has been a fluid concept; to fix the meaning of due pro-
cess "would be to deny every quality of the law but its age, and to
3. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942). The Betts Court managed to reach this result in part
by framing the question as whether the due process clause required counsel "for any offense, ...
in any court," id. at 473, a question plainly not presented in that case. On Betts generally, and
critical of the Betts Court's conclusion that Betts could receive a fair trial without the assistance of
counsel, see Yale Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialogue on
"The Most Pervasive Right" of an Accused, 30 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 42-56 (1962).
4. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). In Gideon, the Court announced that:
"We think the Court in Betts was wrong, however, in concluding that the Sixth Amendment's
guarantee of counsel is not one of these fundamental rights." Id. at 342.
5. Compare Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (stating that "[tihe right to trial
by jury and the immunity from prosecution. . . are not of the very essence of a scheme of ordered
liberty") with Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (stating that "[tihe deep commitment
of the Nation to the right of jury trial in serious criminal cases as a defense against arbitrary law
enforcement qualifies for protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
and must therefore be respected by the States").
6. Compare Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99 (1908) (concluding "that the exemption
from compulsory self-incrimination is not a privilege or immunity of National citizenship guaran-
teed by this clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by the States") with Malloy
v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (applying "the Fifth Amendment's exception from compulsory self-
incrimination" against the states, thus reversing the effect of Twining) and with Miranda v. Ari-
zona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966) (stating that "the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege
[against self-incrimination] is the respect a government-state or federal-must accord to the dig-
nity and integrity of its citizens" (emphasis added)).
7. Evolution, however, has not always gone in one direction. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 111
S. Ct. 1246, 1251 (1991) (applying "harmless error" analysis to coerced confessions, reversing the
automatic reversal rule). See generally notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
8. Justice Scalia, for example, would take an historical view of what constitutes due process,
thus fixing those rights for all time. See Schad v. Arizona, 111 S. Ct. 2491, 2507 (1991) (Scalia
concurring); Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 495 U.S. 604 (1990). Or, at least, sometimes
he says he would; other times it seems that he rejects an historical view when it is contrary to the
result he would like to reach. See California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1550 n.2 (1991) (noting
that "any arcane knowledge of legal history. . . is irrelevant"). See also James D. Gordon III, Free
Exercise on the Mountaintop, 79 Cal. L. Rev. 91, 93 n.20 (1991) (noting that "Justice Scalia. . . is
one of the foremost advocates of the view that the Constitution should be interpreted in light of its
original meaning," except when he chooses to ignore history, as in Employment Division v. Smith,
485 U.S. 660 (1988)).
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render it incapable of progress or improvement."9
The interpretation of the meaning of "due process" has been the
product of ongoing dialogue among state and federal courts and legisla-
tures. 10 In this dialogue the federal district courts have, for the last
forty years, played an important if not starring role. 1 Ever since the
Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Allen, 2 the lower federal courts
have exercised their habeas corpus jurisdiction to define and enforce
the commands of the due process clause.' 3
No more. In Teague v. Lane and its progeny the Supreme Court
9. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 529 (1884).
10. See generally Robert M. Cover and T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism:
Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 Yale L. J. 1035 (1977). The Court's own decisions frequently
take into account the views of state and federal courts and legislatures in defining due process.
See, for example, Gideon, 372 U.S. at 340, 344-45. I have written elsewhere on the use of institu-
tional dialogue to determine judicial jurisdiction. See Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The
Supreme Court, Congress and Federal Jurisdiction, 85 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1 (1990), and on the scope
of judicial remedial power, Barry Friedman, When Rights Encounter Reality: Enforcing Federal
Remedies, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 735 (1992). I intend shortly to take up the question of dialogue in the
definition of rights.
11. See generally Cover and Aleinikoff, 86 Yale L. J. at 1064 (cited in note 10) (addressing
the special influence federal constitutional decisions have on state court decisions as the "federal
utopian tug"); Barry Friedman, A Tale of Two Habeas 73 Minn. L. Rev. 247, 329-40 (1988) (argu-
ing that federal district courts can provide meaningful federal review to habeas corpus petitioners);
Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. 837 (1984).
12. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
13. Friedman, 73 Minn. L. Rev. 247 (cited in note 11). With regard to Brown v. Allen, see
note 24. There is a wealth of good literature on federal habeas corpus jurisdiction, much of it cited
in Friedman, 73 Minn. L. Rev. at 248 n.2. In addition to sources cited there, see the following
recent entries and other articles directly relating to habeas and retroactivity: Ann Althouse, Saying
What Rights Are - In and Out of Context, 1991 Wis. L. Rev. 929; Marc M. Arkin, The Prisoner's
Dilemma: Life in the Lower Federal Courts After Teague v. Lane, 69 N.C. L. Rev. 371 (1991);
Vivian Berger, Justice Delayed or Justice Denied?-A Comment on Recent Proposals to Reform
Death Penalty Habeas Corpus, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1665 (1990); Ellen E. Boshkoff, Resolving Retro-
activity After Teague v. Lane, 65 Ind. L. J. 651 (1990); David R. Dow, Teague and Death: The
Impact of Current Retroactivity Doctrine on Capital Defendants, 19 Hastings Const. L. Q. 23
(1991); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. and Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-retroactivity and Constitu-
tional Remedies, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1731 (1991); Patrick E. Higginbotham, Reflections on Reform
of § 22.54 Habeas Petitions, 18 Hofstra L. Rev. 1005 (1990); Joseph L. Hoffmann, Retroactivity
and the Great Writ: How Congress Should Respond to Teague v. Lane, 1990 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 183
(1990) [hereinafter Hoffmann, Retroactivity]; Joseph L. Hoffmann, The Supreme Court's New
Vision of Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 1989 S. Ct. Rev. 165 [hereinafter Hoffmann,
Habeas]; Kit Kinports, Habeas Corpus, Qualified Immunity, and Crystal Balls: Predicting the
Course of Constitutional Law, 33 Ariz. L. Rev. 115 (1991); Daniel J. Meador, Habeas Corpus and
the "Retroactivity" Illusion, 50 Va. L. Rev. 1115 (1964); Gilbert S. Merritt, Access to Federal
Courts in Habeas Corpus Cases, 58 Tenn. L. Rev. 145 (1990); Kathleen Patchel, The New Habeas,
42 Hastings L. J. 941 (1991); Yale L. Rosenberg, Kaddish for Federal Habeas Corpus, 59 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 362 (1991); Evelyn L. Wilson, Federal Habeas Corpus: An Avenue of Relief for
State Prisoners, 18 S. U. L. Rev. 1 (1991). One good article that came out too close to publication
to cite throughout is James S. Liebman, More Than "Slightly Retro:" The Rehnquist Court's Root
of Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction in Teague v. Lane, 17 N.Y.U. Rev. Law & Soc. Change 537 (1990-
91).
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silenced the habeas courts. 14 The Teague cases hold that in federal
habeas corpus proceedings the lower federal courts may not define the
elements of fair criminal procedure beyond the barriers of clear Su-
preme Court pronouncements.
The decisions in Teague and its progeny are subject to criticism on
several fronts. The judicial crafting of the Teague decision was uneven
at best, all too disingenuous at worst. The Court adopted an extremely
restrictive view of habeas corpus jurisdiction and did so virtually as a
passing aside. For anyone familiar with the climate surrounding the de-
cision it is difficult to conclude that the Court's determination was the
product of much more than unseemly impatience with a Congress that
,was considering related issues, but evidently too slowly for the Court.
Moreover, the result in the Teague cases plainly was the work of a
Court anxious to speed the pace of executions. 6
Although this Article will address all these issues, the focal point is
an additional aspect of Teague and its progeny that particularly of-
fends-the hubris of the Supreme Court.'7 Implicit, and at times ex-
plicit, in the Court's decisions is the message that this silencing of the
lower federal courts, this narrowing of habeas, is appropriate in order to
recast the balance between crime control and constitutional rights. The
Court seems to have concluded that it has identified most of what is
fundamental with regard to fair process and that now it is time to halt
the expansion of, or even curtail, due process rights in order to address
the legitimate needs of law enforcement. 8
What is hubristic about this decision by the Court is the mecha-
nism chosen to effectuate the Court's goals and the impact it will have
on the future definition of rights. The Court was not content to address
the substance of the rights themselves. Rather, in Teague the Court
adopted a rule that will stifle the development of due process and crim-
14. 489 U.S. 288 (1989). See Hoffmann, Habeas, 1989 S. Ct. Rev. at 191 (cited in note 13)
(arguing that "[t]he institutional effect of Teague will be to deprive the lower federal courts of
most of their opportunities to make 'new law' in federal habeas cases, or at least to make 'new law'
in a criminal defendant's favor"); Althouse, 1991 Wis. L. Rev. at 944 (cited in note 13) (arguing
that "Teague v. Lane ended the habeas dialogue by virtually eliminating the federal voice");
Patchel, 42 Hastings L. J. at 1025-28 (cited in note 13).
15. See notes 25-28 and accompanying text. On the lower court's reaction to Teague, see
Arkin, 69 N.C. L. Rev. 371 (cited in note 13).
16. See notes 137-40 and accompanying text. See also Hoffmann, Habeas, 1989 S. Ct. Rev. at
187 (cited in note 13) (noting that one of Teague's most significant effects will be to speed capital
cases).
17. As to hubris, see note 162.
18. See notes 143-47 and accompanying text. See also Merritt, 58 Tenn. L. Rev. at 146 (cited
in note 13) (arguing that "[iun habeas corpus cases, the Bill of Rights is now a relic to be encased
in its present shroud and frozen in time, no longer a living document to be applied to new
situations").
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inal process rights well into the future. Teague ties the hands of habeas
courts in a fashion that future Courts will find difficult to undo without
explicitly overruling Teague. In Teague, therefore, the Court seeks to
reach far into the future, narrowly defining constitutional criminal pro-
cess not just for today but for future generations.
Whatever one thinks of the due process revolution in all of its par-
ticulars, it is difficult to imagine this would be a better world if none of
it had happened. The criminal justice system of the early 1900s sanc-
tioned racism, ' turned a blind eye upon physical and psychological tor-
ture of criminal defendants,20 and virtually ignored the limitations of
the Fourth Amendment.2'1 No progress would have been made had the
Court of 1950 adopted the attitude of the Court of 1990. One can only
guess what society in the year 2030 will think of our criminal justice
system today, but if the current Supreme Court has its way their sys-
tem may not be much different. 22 At the least district federal courts will
have little say in the matter.
This article develops a more convincing rationale for Teague than
that provided by the Court but nonetheless concludes the Court erred
seriously in deciding as it did. Part II of this Article describes the rule
and impact of the Teague cases and criticizes the disingenuous road the
Court took to its decision. Part III offers an alternative explanation for
Teague. This part explains that just as the Supreme Court created
habeas corpus jurisdiction for the very purpose of expanding and pro-
tecting due process rights, so the Court may constrict the availability of
the writ if it perceives that the job of expanding rights is completed.
Part IV analyzes the hubris of a Court so confident that due process has
19. See, for example, Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 481 (1954) (observing that "for the
last twenty-five years there is no record of any person with a Mexican or Latin American name
having served on a jury commission, grand jury or petit jury in Jackson County"); Norris v. Ala-
bama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935) (noting that for generations African-Americans had been excluded from
jury service and jury rolls in Jackson County, Alabama); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 404 (1942)
(recognizing that for over sixteen years in Dallas County there was a "continuous omission of ne-
groes from the grand jury lists").
20. See, for example, Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 229-32, 240 (1941) (writing that
"[wie cannot hold that the illegal conduct in which the law enforcement officers of California in-
dulged, by the prolonged questioning. . .and in the absence of counsel, . . . coerced the confes-
sions, the introduction of which is the infringement of due process"); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322
U.S. 143 (1944) (finding that the defendant was held in custody for 36 hours without sleep or rest);
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 281 (1936) (finding that a confession was coerced by whipping
and hanging).
21. See, for example, Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (holding the Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures not binding on the states);
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 208 (1960) (rejecting the "silver platter doctrine" by which
the federal courts admit evidence unlawfully seized by state officers).
22. Given the trend of the current Court's decisions, the criminal process of the year 2000
may look much like the process in 1960. See notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
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been defined properly for all time, or even this time, that it is willing to
slam shut the doors of habeas courts. This part criticizes the Court's
vision of a criminal justice system devoted solely to determining guilt or
innocence, and challenges the Court's assumption that even in the
realm of guilt and innocence we know all there is to be known. Part V
discusses the inevitable "fall" such hubris will precipitate, speculating
that there will come a time when future Courts will need habeas courts
again, as they once were needed, and will find it difficult to rehabilitate
this now-discredited voice in the dialogue of rights-definition.
II. THE WHAT AND WHY OF TEAGUE
Ever since the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Allen,23 the
federal district courts have been available to test the constitutionality
of a state court criminal conviction.24 "Constitutionality" refers to a de-
termination of whether the procedures and substance of the state crimi-
nal conviction were consistent with prevailing federal constitutional
rules. "Prevailing" certainly meant as of the time of trial and convic-
tion, but, before Teague, it also commonly meant as of the time of the
habeas proceeding. Thus, although habeas courts at a minimum ascer-
tained that the state court had followed constitutional norms governing
at the time of trial, the habeas courts also frequently developed and
implemented natural extensions of existing constitutional rules-"new"
rules if you will.
Teague and its progeny dramatically restricted the power of the
habeas courts. In Teague the Court held that "new" rules of criminal
procedure-rules formulated since the petitioner's original trial-may
not be applied retroactively to a case pending in a habeas court.25
Teague and its progeny define "new" rule with exceptional breadth; a
new rule is any rule that was not on all fours with the state of the law
at the time of the habeas petitioner's original trial.26 Because in the
criminal process area myriad fact situations constantly pose new ques-
tions under existing precedent, few cases can be said to pose precisely
the same legal issue resolved in a prior case. 1
23. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
24. Prior to Brown the scope of habeas was quite limited; the Brown decision assumed, with-
out discussion, that the writ was available to redress any claim of constitutional error in the state
criminal proceeding. See Friedman, 73 Minn. L. Rev. at 253-54 (cited in note 11) (noting that the
writ "now serves in effect as a federal appeal from every state conviction" (emphasis added)); see
also note 33.
25. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311.
26. See notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
27. Two recent excellent articles probe the Court's definition of "new law" in a variety of
contexts such as qualified immunity, compared with the habeas context. See Fallon and Meltzer,
104 Harv. L. Rev. 1731 (cited in note 13) and Kinports, 33 Ariz. L. Rev. 115 (cited in note 13).
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Applying Teague, a habeas court is told essentially this: Your job is
to do nothing more than ensure that the state proceedings comported
with constitutional rules governing at the time of trial.28 Subject to nar-
row exceptions, discussed below, in the post-Teague world a habeas
court may not develop or apply a rule of consitutional law that deviates
from or goes beyond precedent existing at the time of the original crim-
inal trial. In short, the common law process is foreclosed to habeas
courts, who may only apply extant rules in a mechanical fashion.
In so redefining the function of federal habeas courts, the Teague
cases also define the role of the writ of habeas corpus. After Teague,
habeas corpus is reduced to a deterrent, existing only to make sure that
state courts and other state actors "toe the constitutional line." 9 When
state courts, state prosecutors, and state police step out of line and de-
viate from settled norms, federal habeas courts are authorized to put
the state actors back in their place. Otherwise, the habeas courts are to
do nothing. Certainly their voice in the rights-definition dialogue is
muted.
None of the Teague decisions seriously discussed this radical redef-
inition of habeas corpus. Rather, the Court disingenuously character-
ized Teague as nothing more than one further decision in a long line of
cases attempting to resolve perplexing problems regarding the retroac-
tivity of criminal constitutional rules. The entire premise of Teague was
that existing retroactivity rules denied "even-handed justice" to "simi-
larly situated" individuals seeking application of constitutional rules in
their cases.30 Thus, Teague masqueraded as an exercise in achieving
fairness. Moreover, in doing so the Teague Court purported to adopt a
theory of retroactivity advanced by Justice Harlan twenty years ago.31
Teague, however, did neither of these things, or at least it did not do
them very well.
A. The Retroactivity Problem
Teague purports to be a decision that does nothing more than
clean up an untidy corner of retroactivity law.3 2 The ruling, however,
28. There is a serious question about what "governing" means. Does it mean only consistent
with Supreme Court decisions, or with circuit court decisions as well? Butler v. McKellar, 110 S.
Ct. 1212 (1990), suggests, at least, that the former definition applies. See id. at 1215 for a discus-
sion of Seventh Circuit precedent. It surely should be ridiculous to hold that state courts need only
apply the federal law of their circuit, when the Supreme Court ultimately might reverse the federal
circuit's position, and when cases outside the jurisdiction suggested the federal appellate court's
rule was incorrect.
29. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 264 (1969) (Harlan dissenting).
30. Teague, 489 U.S. at 315.
31. Id. at 305-16.
32. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 292 (stating that the issue in the case was the extent to which
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does much more. It is the decision that spelled the end of federal
habeas corpus as we had come to know it. To fully appreciate Teague,
however, it is necessary to understand the Court's purported aim.
The retroactivity problem arises out of the following question: To
whom should the benefit of new rules of constitutional law apply? Prior
to Brown v. Allen, holding that habeas courts could review the convic-
tions of state prisoners for any and all claims of constitutional error,33
the problem was not acute. Collateral attack was generally unavailable,
so retroactivity presented a problem only on direct review. Moreover,
due process as applied to the states had a relatively limited meaning
and therefore, simply put, there were not many rights to which retroac-
tivity could apply, at least with regard to state prisoners. But once the
Supreme Court incorporated the specific guarantees of the Bill of
Rights into the due process clause, the meaning of those rights ex-
panded greatly. And, when the Court ruled in Brown v. Allen that
habeas generally was available to review the convictions of state prison-
ers for constitutional error, retroactivity became a question that re-
quired attention. Particularly because res judicata did not apply to
habeas corpus, any new criminal constitutional rule could lead to the
overturning of countless criminal convictions, even on behalf of those
who had been incarcerated many, many years.34
The Court has tried-and ultimately rejected-seemingly every
possible approach to retroactivity. The Court has held decisions com-
pletely retroactive and applied them even to those incarcerated many
years at the time of the decision.3 5 The Court has decided that a given
decision should have absolutely no retroactive effect, applying only to
new decisions will be applied retroactively on collateral review).
33. Brown did not "hold" this as much as assumed it. See note 20. Prior to Brown some
courts had begun to expand the scope of habeas corpus to this breadth, although purporting to
adhere to the much narrower common law scope of the writ. See Friedman, 73 Minn. L. Rev. at
263 (cited in note 11) (noting that the Court still exerted some effort to "kiss the jurisdictional
book," quoting Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attacks on Criminal Judg-
ments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 151 (1970)).
34. Justice Harlan astutely observed that what appeared to be a retroactivity problem actu-
ally arose from confusion about the purpose of the remedy of habeas corpus. Teague, 489 U.S. at
307-08 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 682-83 (1971) (Harlan separate opinion)).
Professors Fallon and Meltzer have concluded that "new law" questions should be part of the law
of remedies. See Fallon and Meltzer, 104 Harv. L. Rev. at 1768 (cited in note 13).'In 1964 Professor
Meador argued for full retroactivity of new rules. He said: "If the consequences of doing this are
deemed undesirable, the remedy lies in reshaping the writ of habeas corpus, not in a refusal to
apply the Constitution to a case before the court." Meador, 50 Va. L. Rev. at 1120 (cited in note
13). I can only respond: Be careful what you wish for.
35. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987) (holding that new rules shall apply retroac-
tively to all cases on direct review or to those not yet final, even where, as here, the defendant had
been imprisoned for five years).
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proceedings commencing after the date of the decision.3 6 The Court has
determined the retroactivity of some decisions at the time of the consti-
tutional decision itself,3 7 but has in other cases postponed the question
of retroactive effect until a later date.3 8
At the root of the trouble discussed-and purportedly ad-
dressed-in Teague was the approach to retroactivity first espoused in
Linkletter v. Walker,39 which had prevailed for some time. Under the
Linkletter approach the retroactivity of a given rule of constitutional
law was determined by "examining the purpose of the [new] rule, the
reliance of the States on prior law, and the effect on the administration
of justice of a retroactive application of the [new] rule."4 0 Because of
the flexibility inherent in its multifactored analysis, the Linkletter ap-
proach led to results that in some instances seemed terribly unfair. For
example, the Court might apply some constitutional rules only to the
case in which the rule was announced and not even to other cases on
direct review at the time of the announcement.4'
Concern about this seeming inequity led the Court, in Griffith v.
Kentucky, to adopt the position that all new constitutional rules were
retroactive to all cases on direct review at the time of decision.4" Thus,
whether any particular defendant obtained retroactive relief would not
depend upon the happenstance of whether the Court granted certiorari
to review that defendant's case or some other case. After Griffith the
important question left open-and resolved by the Teague Court-was
the rule of retroactivity on collateral review.
In the Teague cases the Supreme Court determined that, unlike
36. See Desist, 394 U.S. at 246 (holding that the decision in Katz "should be given wholly
prospective application"); Kitchens v. Smith, 401 U.S. 847 (1971) (indicating that Gideon v. Wain-
wright was fully retroactive).
37. See, for example, Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 523 n.22 (1968) (granting fully
retroactive application of the holding in the case).
38. See Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 258 (1986) (deciding that the Court's previous decision
in Batson would not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review that became final before the
decision in Batson was announced).
39. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
40. Teague, 489 U.S. at 302.
41. See id. at 302-03 (emphasizing that "[a]pplication of the Linkletter standard led to the
disparate treatment of similarly situated defendants on direct review"). See also Desist, 394 U.S.
at 258-59 (Harlan dissenting) (stating that the Court departs from the "basic judicial tradition" of
treating similarly situated defendants similarly when "we simply pick and choose from among
[them] those who alone will receive the benefit of a 'new' rule of constitutional law").
The most famous example of this arose from the Miranda cases. Miranda limited the benefit
of the new rule to the defendants and to those in companion cases. 384 U.S. 436, 491-99 (1966). In
Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 721, 733-35 (1966), other similarly situated defendants were
not given the benefits even though their cases were on direct review at the time of Miranda. Jus-
tice O'Connor in Teague noted the inequity in this result. 489 U.S. at 303.
42. 479 U.S. at 328.
19921 805
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
direct review, new constitutional rules would have no retroactive effect
on collateral review, subject to two exceptions. One exception permits
the habeas court to apply a new rule if the new rule "places 'certain
kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the
criminal law-making authority to proscribe.' "4s The second exception
permits application of a new rule if the failure of the trial court to ap-
ply the new rule had the effect of "seriously diminish[ing] the likeli-
hood of obtaining an accurate determination" of guilt or innocence.4'
Subsequent cases indicate these exceptions will be applied
infrequently. 45
The definition the Court gave to what constitutes a "new" rule has
had the greatest impact on the scope of habeas review."6 In the Teague
cases the Court determined that a rule is "new" "if the result was not
dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction
became final."' 7 Even if the Court states in a decision that its result is
"controlled by" a prior precedent, its result still is a new rule if the
result in the case was "susceptible to debate among reasonable
minds.' 4 Thus, after Teague, virtually every decision not on all fours
with prior precedent is a new rule.49 And thus, habeas courts have little
to do but enforce clearly-established rules in cases very similar to ex-
isting precedent-if state courts are recalcitrant enough to flout such
rules, which one hopes will not often occur.50
The Court's rationale for the change in retroactivity was "even-
handed justice."'51 Taking the Court at face value, the entire change
wrought by Teague was necessary to avoid the unfairness that could
and did result from the application of Linkletter: sometimes it was a
matter of happenstance which habeas petitioner obtained retroactive
43. Teague, 489 U.S. at 307 (quoting Harlan's separate opinion in Mackey v. United States,
401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971)).
44. Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212, 1218 (1990).
45. With regard to the second exception, at any rate, the Court has made quite clear that
instances of its application will be few and far between. See notes 130-33 and accompanying text.
46. Hoffmann, Habeas, 1989 St. Ct. Rev. at 180 (cited in note 13) (arguing that "the defini-
tion of 'new law' . . . becomes the crucial element of the Teague rule").
47. Teague, 489 U.S. at 301.
48. Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1217.
49. Butler, 110 S. Ct. 1212, is the best example of this. In Butler, the defendant argued that
the decision in Arizona v. Roberson, 436 U.S. 675 (1988), handed down the same day as his rehear-
ing was denied, was an extension of the rule dictated in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
The Court held that even if Roberson was "controlled" by or was within the "logical compass" of
Edwards, this did not prevent it from being a "new rule." Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1217.
50. Experience unfortunately suggests that police and prosecutors ignore constitutional man-
dates quite enough already. In a recent article it was noted that officers' practices have changed
little even in light of cases which purport to protect defendants' rights. Next Stage: Court Lite,
U.S. News & World Rep. 18 (July 8, 1991).
51. Teague, 489 U.S. at 300.
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relief. If the Court granted review of one petitioner's case and an-
nounced a new rule, that person obtained the benefit of the new rule
even if the Court later determined that the rule did not apply retroac-
tively to anyone else now on direct or collateral review. Thus, one de-
fendant on direct review might have obtained the benefit of the new
rule while another did not.
Although this scenario does appear to violate the principle of treat-
ing people in like circumstances alike, Teague does not eliminate the
seeming inequity.52 Rather, Teague just shifts the point of unfairness.
Now whether one gets the benefit of a new rule depends on both how
quickly one's case happens to move through direct review and also still
on the happenstance of which case the Court takes on direct review to
announce a new rule. This happenstance is evident in at least two of
the four Teague cases. 53
The problem is not simply that the Court failed to eliminate the
happenstance, but that such happenstance is inevitable whenever a rule
of retroactivity does anything other than make every rule completely
retroactive. Justice Harlan-the Supreme Court's purported guide in
Teague-recognized that it was impossible to eliminate this happen-
stance when applying rules of retroactivity: "Some discrimination must
always exist in the legal treatment of criminal convicts within a system
where the governing law is continuously subject to change." ' 4 The truth
of Justice Harlan's statement seems so patent that the Teague Court's
entire effort to hang radical change of habeas corpus on the hook of
happenstance is transparent.5
52. The principle of treating people in like circumstances alike is violated, of course, only if
the "like" circumstances are relevant for the purpose of a comparison under the equal protection
clause. See Geoffrey R. Stone, et al., Constitutional Law 499-500 (Little, Brown, 1986). This, in
turn, depends upon the underlying substantive fairness principle for which we decide likeness is
relevant. See Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 537, 539-50 (1982). The
Griffith rule is fair, therefore, only if people on direct appeal but not collateral review are "alike."
Yet the Court in Teague offers no satisfactory discussion of why people on direct review are alike,
but people on collateral review are unalike. Given the happenstance of where one's case might be
at a given time, the only explanation the Court could offer would depend on the arbitrary need to
draw some point for retroactivity purposes. If the point drawn is arbitrary, however, Griffith's rule
did not violate the principle of treating people in similar circumstances differently any more than
any other retroactivity rule did.
53. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 294-96. Teague's case was on habeas when the Court established
the "new" rule in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), subsequently held not to be retroactive
on collateral review. See also Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1216-18 (deciding on the same day that Butler's
rehearing was denied the "new" rule in Roberson which it later refused to apply to Butler). See
also Althouse, 1991 Wis. L. Rev. at 949-50 (cited in note 13) (discussing the bad luck of being the
second to seek the "new" rule).
54. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 689 (Harlan separate opinion).
55. The real question is whether Teague minimizes uizfairness or promotes "even-handed
justice" more than another approach. On its face it seems to do little but trade one arbitrary rule
for another. See notes 52-54.
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Indeed, if the Teague Court truly was concerned about even-
handedness and treating similarly-situated defendants similarly it did
not have far to look. Frank Teague was as likely a candidate as could
exist. From the very beginning of the Court's Teague opinion-the
Court's statement of the facts-one is compelled to wonder just what
the Court was thinking as it talked about "even-handed justice" on its
way to denying Teague's petition.
Teague, "a black man, was convicted by an all-white. . . jury'"5 of
attempted murder, armed robbery, and aggravated battery. The Court
flatly reports that "[d]uring jury selection ...the prosecutor used all
10 of his peremptory challenges to exclude blacks. ' 57 Twice while the
jury was being struck Teague's lawyer asked for a mistrial because the
prosecutor was striking only blacks. In the latter motion Teague's law-
yer said Teague was "entitled to a jury of his peers. '"58 In defense of the
challenges, the prosecutor stated that "he was trying to achieve a bal-
ance of men and women on the jury." 9 The trial court concluded that
"the jury 'appear[ed] to be a fair [one]' "60 and denied the motion.
Under any standard governing today, Teague's conviction would be
reversed. The Court has ruled that the equal protection clause prohibits
discriminatory use of peremptory strikes.6 " The prosecutor's explana-
tion for his conduct is transparent: Were there no white women or men
to strike to achieve balance? Was the striking of all blacks and no
whites an accident? Teague's conviction under such circumstances
hardly can be characterized as "even-handed justice." Rather, the con-
56. Teague, 489 U.S. at 292.
57. Id. at 293. Teague's lawyer struck one black, who was married to a police officer. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. The entire colloquy between Teague's lawyer and the judge is set out in a concurring
opinion by Justice Stevens. Id. at 324-25 n.6. It is clear from the transcript that Justice O'Connor's
use of the word "reasoning" to refer to the trial court's decision process is generous indeed.
61. Batson, 476 U.S. at 89. Batson held that the state in criminal cases could not use its
peremptory challenges to exclude potential jurors solely on the basis of race. Id. The Court has
recently applied the Batson limitation to private litigants in a civil case, Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2088-89 (1991), and has held that the defendant raising a Batson
claim need not be of the same race as the excluded jurors, Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1366
(1991). Although the Court has not addressed the question of whether prosecutors can challenge
criminal defendants' discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, the New York Court of Appeals
has held that "use of racially motivated peremptory jury challenges, whether by defense or prose-
cution, violates New York Constitution's equal protection and civil rights clause." New York v.
Kern, 75 N.Y. 2d 638, 554 N.E.2d 1235, 1235 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1990). See also State v. Levinson, 795
P.2d 845, 846 (Hawaii 1990) (holding that the use of peremptory challenges by defense counsel to
exclude women from a jury because of gender falls outside the bounds of law and requires a non-
discriminatory explanation). But see Katherine Goldwasser, Limiting a Criminal Defendant's Use
of Peremptory Challenges: On Symmetry and the Jury in a Criminal Trial, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 808
(1989) (arguing against extending Batson to the use of peremptory challenges by criminal
defendants).
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viction is tainted with overt racial discrimination.
Unfortunately, Teague's timing was off. His lawyer did raise the
claim on direct appeal, relying primarily on the Sixth Amendment re-
quirement that a jury represent a fair cross section of the community.
This was a reasonable and common tactic of defense counsel in an era
when Swain v. Alabama apparently foreclosed any equal protection
challenge.6 2 Indeed, before Teague's conviction finally was affirmed on
appeal, four Justices indicated in a dissent from a denial of certiorari in
McCray v. New York that the Swain rule was unconscionable; the pri-
mary basis of argument for these Justices was the fair cross section
requirement.6 3
Although the Supreme Court was poised to change the law, it did
not choose Teague's case in which to do so.6 4 Teague brought a habeas
action, again raising his fair cross section claim and also arguing Swain
ought to be reconsidered. One can only speculate why Teague men-
tioned Swain at this time. Perhaps Teague had a new lawyer. More
likely, the intervening dissents from certiorari in McCray suggested the
time was ripe for change. The district court expressed sympathy with
Teague's argument but felt bound by precedent.6 5 The Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the fair cross section re-
quirement gave rise to a valid claim and that Teague had established a
prima facie case.66
From this point on lightning struck Teague repeatedly. The Court
of Appeals, sitting en banc, vacated the panel opinion to rehear-surely
a rare event. Rehearing was postponed until after the Supreme Court
decided Batson v. Kentucky,6 7 in which it ultimately held that the
equal protection clause barred the prosecutor's conduct in Teague's
case. In Allen v. Hardy, however, the Court held that under Linkletter
the Batson rule was not retroactive to cases on collateral review.68 Thus,
the Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, decided that Teague's Batson
claim was barred and his cross section claim was without merit.6 9
62. The Court's decision in Smith v. Murray would suggest counsel acted properly in not
raising a claim that was contrary to settled law. 477 U.S. 527, 535-36 (1986) (finding that the
"process of 'winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal and focusing on' those more likely to
prevail, far from being evidence of incompetence, is the hallmark of effective appellate advocacy"
(quoting Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1983))).
63. McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961, 963 (1983) (Marshall dissenting).
64. The Court denied certiorari in Teague v. Illinois, 464 U.S. 867 (1983).
65. Teague v. Lane, 820 F.2d 832, 834 (7th Cir. 1987) (en banc).
66. Id. at 843.
67. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
68. Allen, 478 U.S. at 257-58.
69. The Court of Appeals also held that the Swain claim was barred procedurally because it
was not raised in state court and was meritless. Teague, 489 U.S. at 294-95. As I have argued
elsewhere, this application of procedural default is perverse. It would have been foolish for a corn-
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As indicated, if the Teague Court was trying to eliminate happen-
stance, the treatment Teague received suggests it did not do a very
good job of it. It was happenstance that the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit granted an en banc hearing in Teague's case; the court
might have waited to see how the remand played out before ruling on
the merits of the claim. Moreover, Teague's case happened to be on
collateral review rather than direct appeal when Batson was decided, in
part because the Supreme Court happened to take another petitioner's
case, and not Teague's, to establish the new equal protection rule.
Worse yet was the Supreme Court's arbitrary treatment of Teague.
In Teague the Supreme Court happened to break the very rule it was
establishing, applying "new" law to Teague on collateral review in a
case in which the parties neither briefed nor argued the matter.70
Finally, the Supreme Court applied its own rules to deny Teague
relief even though it had granted Batson relief under identical circum-
stances. Teagues's lawyer on direct review happened to rely upon the
fair cross section requirement rather than urging the courts to overrule
Swain; the basis for the claim was the same, however, and as a litiga-
tion tactic the course seems sound. Indeed, Batson's lawyer raised a
Sixth Amendment cross section claim, not an equal protection claim,
and Batson, unlike Teague, obtained relief on equal protection
grounds. 71 Thus, Teague, a clear case of racial discrimination, "hap-
pened" to fall through the cracks. As a matter of retroactivity policy the
validity of this result is debatable. A concern about happenstance, how-
ever, hardly is a convincing basis for establishing rules that permitted
this result in Teague's case.
Of course, happenstance and a concern for "even handed justice"
were not really why the Court decided the Teague cases the way that it
did. Everyone who follows this area of the law knows the Teague cases
were not really about retroactivity, but about habeas-about curtailing
habeas.72 Deciding Teague as though it were nothing more than a case
petent lawyer to waste an appellate bullet on a Swain claim, or even a challenge to Swain; yet, the
lawyer fashioned an almost identical claim under the cross section requirement. See Friedman, 73
Minn. L. Rev. at 295-98 (cited in note 11) (discussing Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 522 (1986)). See
also note 11 and accompanying text (discussing how the Supreme Court was more lenient with
other defendants raising Swain/Batson claims).
70. One might surmise from this result that Teague holds that rules which would benefit
petitioners do not apply retroactively, but rules that would harm them do.
71. Batson, 476 U.S. at 85 n.4. The Court in other peremptory strike cases has also been less
demanding about exactly how the claim is raised. See Ford v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 850, 854-55
(1991) (deciding that Ford "must be treated as having raised such a [Batson] claim, although he
certainly failed to do it with . . . clarity"; although the motion referred to the Sixth Amendment
and state courts believed Ford used a cross-section claim, the "allegation could reasonably have
been intended and interpreted" to raise an equal protection claim).
72. See part II.
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about cleaning up a corner of retroactivity law, while quietly and se-
verely curtailing habeas as an aside, was all too disingenuous and
unconvincing.
B. Teague's Purported Reliance on Justice Harlan
Justice O'Connor, writing for a plurality in Teague (in a part of the
decision that a clear majority of the Court embraced in subsequent
cases), would have the reader believe that the Court's decision simply
adopted a sensible suggestion made twenty years before by Justice
Harlan. 3 This is unfair to Justice Harlan. What the Teague plurality
actually did was piece together different things Justice Harlan said
about habeas corpus and retroactivity,7' including positions that Justice
Harlan later discarded, and then, for good measure add some new
thoughts of their own.7 One might say that the Teague decision resem-
bles Justice Harlan's views much like a kidnapping note pasted to-
gether from stray pieces of newsprint resembles the newspaper from
which it came.
The Teague Court deviated from Justice Harlan's approach in
three extremely significant ways.76 First, the Court's entire retroactivity
model hinges on the definition of "new rule." Yet the Court interprets
"new rule" in a fashion diametrically opposed to-and thus much nar-
rower than-that of Justice Harlan. Justice Harlan knew that defining
"new rule" would be difficult.77 He undertook to define the phrase with
reference to the purposes of the writ of habeas corpus. To the extent
that encouraging state courts to follow federal law was the purpose of
habeas, Harlan suggested new rules should be any rules other than set-
tled law at the time of trial and rules within the "logical compass" of
settled rules.78 The logical compass proviso was essential; any narrower
definition of "new rule," would permit state courts to evade the
73. Teague, 489 U.S. at 303-312.
74. See notes 76-89 and accompanying text.
75. The Court may also have added some of the thoughts of Judge Friendly and Paul Bator.
Parts of the Court's view on habeas that fairly cannot even be attributed to Justice Harlan seem to
be traceable back to influential writings of these two scholars. See Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence
Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142 (1970); Paul Bator,
Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441
(1963).
76. For a probing examination of the differences between Teague and Justice Harlan's pro-
posals, see Patchel, 42 Hastings L. J. at 990-1012 (cited in note 13).
77. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 695 (1971). (stating that "in Desist I went to
some lengths to point out the inevitable difficulties that will arise in attempting 'to determine
whether a particular decision has really announced a 'new' rule at all.'" (quoting from Desist v.
United States, 394 U.S. 244, 263 (1969) (Harlan dissenting))).
78. Desist, 394 U.S. at 264.
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supremacy of federal law.79 Harlan's approach, therefore, would allow
habeas courts to continue their evolutionary role in rights-definition
within the ambit of the "logical compass" principle. The Teague Court,
however, adopts an approach opposite to this principle, defining a new
rule as any rule not on all fours with prior precedent.8s
Second, while purporting to adopt Justice Harlan's exception to his
theory of retroactivity,81 the Court actually adopted a narrow exception
that Justice Harlan expressly disavowed. Harlan originally proposed
that new rules that had an impact on the truth-finding process would
still apply retroactively. 2 Harlan changed his view on this exception,
however, because he recognized that the aim of criminal procedure is
not limited to determining guilt and innocence. Harlan therefore pro-
posed a broader exception that included any new rule that was "funda-
mental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."83 The Teague
Court rejected Harlan's broader definition in favor of the narrower one
he later repudiated.
Finally, the Court professed to agree with Justice Harlan's descrip-
tion of the proper function of habeas corpus, but instead it adopted a
view of habeas corpus Justice Harlan himself disavowed. In Desist v.
United States, Justice Harlan stated that one of the two purposes of
the writ of habeas corpus was deterrence-to provide "additional incen-
tive for trial and appellate courts throughout the land to conduct their
proceedings in a manner consistent with established constitutional
standards. 8 4 The Teague Court adopted deterrence as the primary
purpose of habeas. Subsequent to Desist, in Mackey v. United States,85
however, Justice Harlan took a different tack. He determined that it
was impossible to provide a theoretically sound basis for habeas; habeas
could only be defined from the "bottom up," by looking at what it was
habeas actually did. 6 In this context Harlan addressed the argument
for full retroactivity-"constitutional updating" of all convictions.8 7
Harlan disapproved, stating his own view that this approach overlooked
79. Id. at 263-65.
80. Teague, 489 U.S. at 301. Professor Hoffmann is critical of this aspect of Teague: "The
Court can and should expect more from state courts than simply the ability to read headnotes and
follow clear, binding federal precedents." Hoffmann, Retroactivity, 1990 B.Y.U. L. Rev. at 211
(cited in note .13). See also Fallon and Meltzer, 104 Harv. L. Rev. at 1796 (cited in note 13) (argu-
ing that the Supreme Court's test for a new law is "far too broad").
81. Teague, 489 U.S. at 310.
82. Desist, 394 U.S. at 262 (Harlan dissenting).
83. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693 (quoting Justice Cardozo in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,
325 (1937)).
84. 394 U.S. at 262-63.
85. 401 U.S. 667, 675 (1971).
86. Id. at 685.
87. Id. at 689.
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the importance of finality."" Thus, Harlan determined that only law
governing at the time of conviction should be applied.89 But Harlan's
view of "established" law, again, was far broader than the Teague
Court's, as were his two exceptions.
The impact of the Teague Court's approach to retroactivity on
habeas corpus was dramatic. Before Teague, even laden with the ever-
more-restrictive procedural rules governing habeas, the habeas court
was an active participant in the dialogue fashioning new rules of crimi-
nal constitutional procedure. Now, the habeas courts are but traffic cops
for the Supreme Court, doing little more than denying petitions and
chastening the occasional errant state court that strays from the consti-
tutional fold.
In Teague, albeit in passing, the Court formally changed its entire
approach to habeas corpus. Prior to Teague the Court had offered sev-
eral rationales for habeas. The Court had suggested habeas was neces-
sary to vindicate constitutional rights,90 to ensure deprivations of
liberty were consistent with constitutional commands," or even-more
recently-to ensure innocent people were not incarcerated. 2 But these
prior decisions 93 did not foreshadow the "deterrent" theory advanced
by the Court in Teague.9'
Nonetheless, the Court attempted to weave its decision into the
fabric of prior precedent by relying upon Justice Harlan.95 The Court's
reliance on Justice Harlan was misplaced, however, for Justice Harlan
never advocated the rule rendered in the Teague cases, nor did he ad-
vocate the result those cases compel.9
The Court's clumsy attempt to attribute its views to Justice Harlan
is puzzling. It may have wanted simply to paint the entire structure
with a gloss of legitimacy, much in the custom of the common law tradi-
tion. If so, the Court failed, for the attempt is not even credible.
The value of candor in judicial decisionmaking is much debated.9 7
88. Id. at 691 (arguing that "a rule of law that fails to take account of these finality interests
would do more than subvert the criminal process itself").
89. Id. at 689.
90. See Friedman, 73 Minn. L. Rev. at 26 (cited in note 11).
91. Id. at 268.
92. Id. at 278.
93. Hoffmann, 1989 S. Ct. Rev. at 175 (cited in note 13).
94. 489 U.S. at 306.
95. See note 73 and accompanying text.
96. Compare Hoffmann, Retroactivity, 1990 B.Y.U. L. Rev. at 199 (cited in note 13) (stating
that the Teague exception resembles Harlan's decisions, but the resemblance is "only skin deep").
97. See Nicholas Zeppos, Judicial Candor and Statutory Interpretation, 78 Georgetown L.
J. 353, 359 (1989) (arguing "that judicial candor in statutory interpretation is much more problem-
atic than it seems"). But see David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 Harv. L. Rev.
731 (1987) (advocating the need for candor in judicial decisionmaking).
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Even those who discount the importance of candor, however, no doubt
expect a less-than-candid court to pull it off, i.e., to be convincing. The
foregoing criticism of Teague has been harsh, but deservedly so. The
opinions in the Teague cases, particularly Teague and Butler, are pain-
fully disengenuous. They detract from the Court's credibility. This too
might be tolerable if there were no other way for the Court to achieve
its objective. In the next section, however, I provide what not only is a
more credible rationale for Teague, but also a rationale that likely mo-
tiviated the Teague decision.
III. A BETTER EXPLANATION FOR TEAGUE
If Teague had succeeded in getting a court to address the merits of
his claim, the preceedings would have looked something like the follow-
ing. Teague would have pointed to the high number of peremptory
strikes used on blacks rather than on whites. The disparity is high
enough that the burden would have shifted to the prosecution to offer a
legitimate explanation for the strikes that were exercised.98 The prose-
cution's proferred explanation in Teague was patently spurious.9 9 Thus,
a court would have concluded that, in the absence of a legitimate expla-
nation for what occurred at trial, it was appropriate to presume what
the evidence suggested-that the prosecution intended to strike all
blacks from the jury in a discriminatory (i.e., racially-motivated and
without a nonrace based reason) fashion.
This type of analysis is common in discrimination cases, but it is
not unique to that context. It is a common-sense approach to separating
real explanations from contrived ones that is relied upon frequently in
law. The process of litigating is, in essence, one of fitting arguments to
facts. Similarly, academics take theoretical constructs and fit them to
evidence. In both instances logic suggests that success is achieved when
there is a certain "fit" between the evidence available and the proferred
explanation; absent that fit we suspect the truth eludes us still.
Applying this "fit" analysis suggests that the Teague Court's expla-
nation of why it was adopting a new theory of habeas corpus was not
candid, and that we must look further for the true rationale. Put sim-
ply, the "fit" between what the Court did and what it said it was doing
is not very good. The Court's deterrence theory is so ill-defined that it
is difficult to match decisions to the theory. 100 Moreover, some of the
98. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.
99. Teague, 489 U.S. at 293. The prosecutor said he was trying to achieve a balance between
men and women. Id. But as noted earlier, there were other ways to achieve this balance, even if
such balance made any difference. See notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
100. The Court states that "[w]e agree with Justice Harlan's description of the function of
habeas corpus." Teague, 489 U.S. at 308. But which description? Justice Harlan offered several
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Court's claims are demonstrably incorrect; for example, the Court erro-
neously states that it "never" has defined the scope of the writ solely to
ensure trials free of constitutional error. 10 1
More important, however, to the extent that the Court tried to ar-
ticulate a theory of habeas corpus it really provided two separate theo-
ries, neither of which accord with the language of the statute, with
history, or with common sense. The Court held that only "old" rules
may be applied by habeas courts. 102 This rule rests on a deterrence the-
ory of the writ: In order to ensure that state courts adhere to constitu-
tional commands, habeas corpus exists to reverse convictions obtained
in state courts that did not toe the constitutional line. 103 Although there
is some support for such a theory in the habeas statute,104 the theory
has little or no historical antecedent.0 5 Finally, the deterrence theory
seems to fly in the face of the current Court's philosophy of judicial
federalism. In the view of the current Court, state and federal courts
have both the same duty to adhere to constitutional commands and
equal ability to apply constitutional rules. 06 Why then adopt a theory
descriptions of habeas corpus. See notes 84-89 and accompanying text. The Court clearly adopts
none of them, instead piecing together bits and pieces of things Harlan said. See Teague, 489 U.S.
at 305-10. The Court talks of balancing the need for finality with considerations of comity, ex-
plores the use of habeas as a threat to force state courts to adhere to constitutional norms, and
adopts "exceptions" that suggest even other theories such as guilt/innocence. Id. at 305-14.
101. Id. at 308 (quoting Harlan from Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 477 (1986)). Subse-
quent to Brown v. Allen the Court did just that. True, claims still could be procedurally-defaulted,
but contrary to the Court's occasional protestations, see, for example, Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 448
n.8 and Teague, 489 U.S. 308-09, this had nothing to do with the writ's scope. Rather, in the post-
Brown, pre-Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), era such defaults were seen as jurisdictional bars, an
application of the adequate and independent state ground doctrineto habeas corpus. See Daniels
v. Allen, decided sub nom. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. at 482-87 (refusing to address the merits of
the petitioner's claim because the independent doctrine bars a habeas court from hearing a proce-
durally defaulted claim in state court). The distinction is concededly a technical one, but it is
important, and-after all-the Court created the distinction in the first place. It could at least be
charged with remembering and understanding. Compare Althouse, 1991 Wis. L. Rev. at 933 (cited
in note 13) (discussing the "Court" as a continuous institution).
Moreover, one could interpret the rule in the Teague cases as defining the writ "solely" with
regard to ensuring a trial free from constitutional error. That is precisely what Teague does, it just
defines "constitutional error" far more narrowly than prior cases.
102. See notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
103. See notes 84-94 and accompanying text.
104. The habeas statute commands federal courts to grant the writ to anyone "in custody in
violation of the Constitution." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1988). This language could be interpreted to
mean in custody in violation of constitutional rules existing at the time of conviction, but it never
has been interpreted this way.
105. The historical basis for the theory seems only to be Justice Harlan's single dissent in
Desist. 394 U.S. at 262-63. See notes 84-94 and accompanying text. See also Kinports, 33 Ariz. L.
Rev. at 178 (cited in note 13).
106. See Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 443 (1977) (stating that" 'state courts have the
solemn responsibility equally with the federal courts' to safeguard constitutional rights" and to
restrain a state court from doing so would "'reflec[t] negatively upon the state court's ability'"
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premised explicitly on state court disobedience, particularly in light of
countervailing finality concerns recognized by the Court?10 7 Why not
just get rid of habeas altogether?
The Court's exceptions to the Teague rule rest on a completely dif-
ferent theory of habeas review. These exceptions rely on habeas to weed
out the guilty petitioners from the unjustly convicted, or the innocent.
This "innocence" theme runs through many of the Court's recent
habeas decisions, 10 8 although innocence is defined differently in differ-
ent cases. 109 Regardless, an innocence approach finds no support in the
statute, and its only historical pedigree is a 21-year-old law review
article. 110
This innocence approach also clashes with the Court's philosophy
on federalism. It strongly suggests that habeas courts will rehash ex-
actly what happened in the state courts. How this shows respect for
state courts is very difficult to explain. Why have federal review of state
decisions only to test for what typically is seen as appellate error? After
all, as the Court stated in Teague, habeas "is not designed as a substi-
tute for direct review."''
The absence in Teague of a convincing theory of habeas corpus
does not distinguish it from other habeas decisions. This failure to ex-
plain adequately the purpose of habeas is commonplace. From 1867 un-
til 1953 the Court applied a theory of habeas that limited the writ's
scope to that at common law, despite enactment in 1867 of a habeas
statute considerably broader on its face." 2 The Court never explained
(citations omitted)).
107. See notes 137-42 and accompanying text.
108. See Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 454 (concluding "that the 'ends of justice' require federal
courts to entertain [habeas] petitions only where the prisoner supplements his constitutional claim
with a colorable showing of factual innocence"); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986) (stat-
ing that "even in the absence of a showing of cause for the procedural default" a federal court
could grant a writ to those actually innocent). On the "rhetoric of innocence" and the Court's
habeas decisions, see generally Patchel, 42 Hastings L. J. at 958-83 (cited in note 13).
109. Sometimes the theory suggests habeas exists to separate the guilty from the innocent.
See, for example, Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496. Other opinions suggest habeas exists to
enforce constitutional rules that go to accurate determinations of guilt or innocence. See, for exam-
ple, Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490 (1976) (stating that "the physical evidence sought to be
excluded is typically reliable and often the most probative information bearing on the guilt or
innocence of the defendant").
110. See Friendly, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 142 (cited in note 75). Judge Friendly's premise was
that "convictions should be subject to collateral attack only when the prisoner supplements his
constitutional plea with a colorable claim of innocence." Id.
111. Teague, 489 U.S. at 306 (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 683 (Harlan separate opinion)).
112. See Friedman, 73 Minn. L. Rev. at 262 (cited in note 11) (stating that "[d]espite its
broad language, for some sixty years after its enactment the Act of 1867 found almost no applica-
tion to convicted prisoners held in state custody"); Friedman, 85 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 10 (cited in
note 10) (stating that even after enactment of the Habeas Act of 1867 "the Court confined federal
habeas jurisdiction to its extremely narrow common law scope").
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its seeming disregard of Congress's command. In 1953 the Court broad-
ened the scope of habeas to include review of every constitutional claim,
an interpretation quite consistent with the statutory language, but the
Court never explained the reason for the dramatic shift.113 After 1953,
the Court, as it continued to remove procedural restrictions on the writ,
offered at least two distinct theories of habeas corpus, neither of which
"fit" the facts or made complete sense.' 4 Then, in the 1970s, 1980s and
1990s the Court narrowed the writ's scope and replaced procedural bar-
riers, both trying to square its decisions with prior explanations and
offering new views of the scope of the writ.11 5 Thus, Teague may be
read as only the latest chapter in a winding treatise concerning the cha-
meleon-like writ.
There is, however, one explanation for habeas corpus that explains
the writ's tortured course. Elsewhere I have offered a closely-related ex-
planation for the Court's unexplained expansion of the scope of the writ
in Brown v. Allen." 6 That explanation, however, is perhaps more inter-
esting when applied to Teague, which is, one might say, at the latter
end of the rise and fall of habeas. Nonetheless, to understand the expla-
nation we must return briefly to Brown.
Brown v. Allen marked the beginning of the "due process revolu-
tion.""'  Hindsight makes quite clear what might only have been dimly
perceived at the time. The Court was poised both to apply the Bill of
Rights to the states and to expand dramatically the meaning of those
enumerated rights. But the Court rapidly discovered it could not do the
job alone. Thus, in Brown, the Court enlisted the assistance of the lower
courts in the task."'
There were two reasons the habeas courts were needed to move the
due process revolution along. One reason is evident in much that fol-
113. Friedman, 73 Minn. L. Rev. at 264-65 (cited in note 11) (discussing Brown v. Allen, 344
U.S. 443 (1953)).
114. See id. at 267-73 (addressing the rights-based theory and the liberty-based theory).
115. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977) (holding that a rule "barring federal
habeas review absent a showing of 'cause' and 'prejudice' attendant to a state procedural waiver,
[shall] be applied to a waived objection to the admission of a confession at trial"); Kuhlmann v.
Wilson, 477 U.S. at 454 (see note 108 for holding); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 497 (holding that
a defendant's claim defaulted without cause can be heard for habeas relief only if he can show
actual innocence).
116. Friedman, 73 Minn. L. Rev. at 273-77 (cited in note 11).
117. See Brown, 344 U.S. at 500 (recognizing "the expanding concept of due process")
(Frankfurter separate opinion). Of course, the formal beginning may have come sometime after the
first shots were fired. On the due process revolution generally, see Erwin N. Griswold, The Due
Process Revolution and Confrontation, 119 U. Pa. L. Rev. 711, 712 (1971) (arguing that the heart
of the constitutional revolution is found in the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause); Fred
P. Graham, The Self-Inflicted Wound 26-66 (MacMillan, 1970).
118. See Friedman, 73 Minn. L. Rev. at 274 (cited in note 11).
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lowed; the Court did not trust state courts to adhere to established
rules, let alone to be progressive with regard to formulating new rules.
Habeas courts could supervise state court adherence to constitutional
commands. Such an explanation-supervision of state courts-rings far
truer out of the mouth of the Warren Court than that of the Burger
and Rehnquist Courts." 9
Additionally, the habeas courts were vitally important to the cen-
tral task of invigorating the Bill of Rights. Criminal constitutional law
involves myriad factual situations in which subtle factual differences
lead to dramatically different legal treatment. 20 Fashioning rules in
this context required a bevy of courts that could gain familiarity with
police practices and accomodate new rules to law enforcement needs.
Moreover, it is consistent with the common law tradition to let matters
percolate in lower courts before the Supreme Court makes a pronounce-
ment.'2' Not much percolation was likely in the state courts; thus, the
Supreme Court drafted the lower federal courts into service.
This analysis not only describes the circumstances at the time of
Brown, but it also suggests a more fluid and dynamic view of habeas
than the Court has provided.'22 If the habeas courts were indeed the
Supreme Court's footsoldiers in the due process revolution, then a
change in the nature of that conscription logically should follow the
Court's changing philosophy of criminal constitutional law and renewed
trust of state courts.
The Court has been saying for some time that state courts are to be
trusted with claims of constitutional right. The assertion of parity arises
119. It is ironic, therefore, that the Rehnquist Court trumpets this rationale (but does not
mean it), while the Warren Court meant this rationale but had the decorum to be delicate about it.
See Michael Wells, Is Disparity a Problem?, 22 Ga. L. Rev. 283, 311-12 (1988) In the sixties, many,
including the Warren Court, felt state law criminal procedure was woefully inadequate.
120. Compare United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977) (finding that a warrantless
search hours after the initial seizure was unjustified when the object of the search was a footlocker
incidentally seized from inside an auto) with United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-24 (1982)
(finding that a warrantless on-the-spot search supported by probable cause was constitutional
when the object of the search was an automobile, and the search incidentally turned up bags of
marijuana) and with California v. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 1991 (1991) (rejecting the "curious line
[drawing] between the search of an automobile that coincidentally turns up a container and the
search of a container that coincidentally turns up in an automobile" by holding that police can
search both when they have probable cause to believe contraband is contained in either). Compare
also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981) (holding that once the defendant invoked his
rights under Miranda for questioning about one offense, he could not be later questioned regarding
any offense until he was provided with counsel) with McNeil v. Wisconsin, 111 S. Ct. 2204, 2208
(1991) (finding that a defendant invoking the Sixth Amendment right to counsel for the charge at
issue can be questioned later for other offenses when he waived Miranda).
121. Althouse, 1991 Wis. L. Rev. at 941 n.63 (cited in note 13).
122. Several commentators support such a theory of dynamic statutory construction. See
William N. Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1479 (1987); Zeppos,
78 Georgetown L. J. at 359 (cited in note 97).
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not only in the habeas context, but in the litigation of civil rights claims
as well. 123 This view of parity differs from judicial statements of twenty
or thirty years ago-or fifty years ago-that evinced less trust of state
courts. 124 If the Court believes parity now exists, the necessity of habeas
courts to ensure state courts adhere to constitutional requirements is
limited somewhat.
Parity, however, is a controversial topic. Academics debate whether
parity really exists.2 5 Perhaps more important, many argue that parity
questions are for Congress to decide. 26 Because Congress has assigned
habeas courts to the task of hearing collateral attacks on state judg-
ments, some commentators question the Court's authority to unravel
that decision.2 7
With regard to parity, however, the Court is uniquely positioned to
evaluate and address changes in state court sensitivity. The Court, after
all, reviews countless decisions from the state courts. Furthermore, the
Court's concerns about parity evidently led in part to the incorporation
of the Bill of Rights into the due process clause and the extension of
the breadth of habeas review. Thus, the Court should have the author-
ity to continue to evaluate and address parity as it moves in the other
direction.
In addition to the parity rationale the dynamic view of habeas has
another component-the use of habeas courts to expand constitutional
rights. Teague suggests-finally-that this may have been the heart of
the Court's agenda for some time. In this regard, it is instructive to look
at what Teague does, rather than what the Court says. Teague, by lim-
iting the power of habeas courts to applying only clearly established
rules, ensures that the federal say on criminal constitutional rights will
123. See, for example, Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. at 443 (stating that state courts are
responsible, with federal courts, for protecting rights, and presuming that state courts are able to
do so).
124. See, for example, Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961) (holding that federal rights
need to be enforced in federal courts because state courts might not enforce those rights).
125. See Wells, 22 Ga. L. Rev. at 324 (cited in note 119) (contesting the notion of parity
between state and federal courts); Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1105,
1105 (1977) (stating that the "assumption of parity is . . . a dangerous myth"); Michael E.
Solimine and James L. Walker, Constitutional Litigation in Federal and State Courts: An Empir-
ical Analysis of Judicial Parity, 10 Hastings Const. L. Q. 213 (1983) (arguing that there is parity).
See also Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary, 36
UCLA L. Rev. 233, 237 (1988); Martin H. Redish, Judicial Parity, Litigant Choice, and Demo-
cratic Theory: A Comment on Federal Jurisidiction and Constitutional Rights, 36 UCLA L. Rev.
329, 330 n.4 (1988); Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Courts, State Courts and the Constitution: A
Rejoinder to Professor Redish, 36 UCLA L. Rev. 369, 381-82 (1988).
126. See Redish, 36 UCLA L. Rev. at 342-46 (cited in note 125) (recognizing that Congress
has constitutional authority to establish the extent of jurisdiction).
127. See id. at 343 (arguing that such action would "constitute judicial lawmaking of the
most sweeping nature" (citation omitted)).
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come primarily from the Supreme Court.12 This narrowing of the role
of habeas courts coincides with and complements the Court's obvious
effort to narrow and to curtail constitutional rights, particularly in the
criminal context. 129
Motives aside, 3 ° it undoubtedly is the Court's prerogative to deter-
mine the level of constitutional rights. The Court is, after all, the "ulti-
mate arbiter" of the meaning of the Constitution.13" ' The primary
functions of the Court are to determine the content of constitutional
rights and to defend those rights against governmental action.
Thus, the Court might have told us in Teague that it had con-
cluded that criminal constitutional rights had reached their apex. For
that reason, the habeas courts were now out of business. The habeas
courts had been drafted, had served their function, and could now re-
tire from the field. That is what Teague did. It took habeas courts out
of the business of defining rights.'32
Here, then is a view of Teague, and habeas, that bears some rela-
tionship to Brown. This dynamic view of habeas serves to explain
Brown and Teague together, and to reconcile the flow and ebb of
habeas.13 3 Indeed, this explanation ties Teague to Brown, and makes
some coherent sense out of the history of the writ.
IV. THE HUBRIS OF TEAGUE
The preceding section explains why a Court might decide to take
the habeas courts out of the business of defining rights. The next im-
portant question is why this Court decided at this time to do so.
There are two possible reasons why this Court might have decided
that the time was ripe for a decision like Teague. One reason relates to
128. The lower federal courts still can fashion new rules in the context of federal criminal
trials. But this eliminates an institutional advantage of the habeas courts, which is that they could
review the claims of right with a relatively dispassionate eye. In federal criminal cases the federal
courts serve as enforcement courts just like the state trial courts. See Althouse, 1991 Wis. L. Rev.
at n.68 (cited in note 13).
129. See note 134.
130. The Court's motives will be addressed in the next section.
131. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (stating that the Court's pronouncements are
"the supreme law of the land").
132. Hoffmann, Habeas, 1989 S. Ct. Rev. at 190-92 (cited in note 13) (arguing that Teague
will have a "far-reaching" "institutional effect" on the development of criminal procedure rules).
133. Judge Higginbotham has expressed the view that "the Teague ruling ... comports well
with" my appellate model of habeas, discussed at length in Friedman, 73 Minn. L. Rev. 247 (cited
in note 11). See Higginbotham, 18 Hofstra L. Rev. at 1015-16 (cited in note 13). I do not agree that
an appellate model leads where Teague and its progeny have taken us. As my prior work makes
clear, I approve of limiting habeas generally to one trip to a habeas court. But because I see the
habeas courts as a surrogate for Supreme Court review in most cases, I would apply new rules to
this one trip to a habeas court.
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the content of criminal procedure rights. The other reason relates to a
concern about the costs of the habeas process. Both reasons appear to
have motivated the Teague Court's decision.
First, it is evident that this Court has a great hostility to the rights
of criminal defendants. 13  The Court appears to see criminal procedure
rights as juxtaposed against the legitimate need of crime-fighting police
forces. 35 Decision after decision suggests the Court believes that bal-
ance has been struck incorrectly in the past. Thus, the Rehnquist Court
is overruling and stepping around the decisions of the Warren Court,
and even the Burger Court, scaling back in dramatic fashion the rights
accorded criminal defendants.
For a Court with the mission of restriking the crime control/consti-
tutional rights balance, the habeas courts pose a problem. Habeas tends
to be a one-way ratchet with regard to rights, moving primarily in the
direction of expansion. Because the question in habeas cases is whether
rights were violated, the habeas courts generally have greater occasion
to expand settled rights (or to simply demur on the question put),
rather than to cut back on rights.136
Second, habeas may have costs associated with it beyond the ex-
pansion of rights. For example, habeas often is said to interfere with
principles of federalism because federal courts overturn the judgments
of state courts and release convicted prisoners. 37 More often, habeas is
134. Surely the big story from the 1990 Term will be the speed with which the Court moved
to remove constitutional protections from criminal defendants. See Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct.
2597, 2608 (1991) (allowing juries to consider "victim impact" evidence); California v. Acevedo,
111 S. Ct. 1982, 1991 (1991) (permitting a search of a container in a car without a warrant);
Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2701-02 (1991) (upholding Michigan's imposition of a life
sentence with no possibility of parole for a defendant convicted of possessing 650 grams of co-
caine); California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547 (1991) (restricting the meaning of seizure under the
Fourth Amendment); Florida V. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991) (finding that Florida police tactics
in searching a boarded bus passenger for drugs did not necessarily constitute a seizure).
135. See, for example, McNeil, 111 S. Ct. at 2207 (balancing in favor of the police the inter-
est in "investigating new or additional crimes" after an individual is formally charged with one
crime against a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel (quoting Maine v. Moulton, 474
U.S. 159, 179-80 (1985)); Riverside v. McLaughlin, 111 S. Ct. 1661, 1670-71 (1991) (balancing in
the state's favor the time it takes police to determine probable cause for a warrantless arrest and
the defendant's right to a "prompt" determination). See also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 541 (White
dissenting) (arguing that "[t]he rule announced today will measurably weaken the ability of the
criminal law to perform these tasks").
136. Habeas courts obviously cannot cut back on rights by reversing Supreme Court determi-
nations of rights, but it is not wholely accurate to say that habeas courts cannot narrow rights;
they can do so by giving narrow construction to the principles set out in prior cases as myriad fact
situations come before them. Thus, in the course of adjudicating a number of habeas cases, a
habeas court actually may narrow a right beyond the compass it had been thought to have.
137. See Friedman, 73 Minn. L. Rev. at 271, 334-37 (cited in note 11) (summarizing the
federalism argument that it is "demeaning to allow the lower courts of one sovereign to supervise
the work of another sovereign's highest courts"); Hoffmann, Retroactivity, 1990 B.Y.U. L. Rev. at
204-06 (cited in note 13).
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attacked because it gives too little respect to the principle of finality:
Because res judicata theoretically does not apply, 3 s habeas results in
potentially repetitive review that thwarts the state's interest in finality
of its criminal process.13
The current Court has expressed its impatience with these costs,
primarily in the context of death penalty cases. In nondeath cases sup-
posedly unending review does not pose a great finality problem, given
that the prisoner remains in prison while litigating. Thus, punishment
does not await the end of habeas proceedings. In the death penalty con-
text, however, habeas is seen as slowing the process toward imposing
the death sentence, which is the state's ultimate goal. The Rehnquist
Court has not been shy to express its concern that federal habeas is
slowing the death process. 140 Indeed, in a display of what might strike
one as remarkable impropriety, members of the Court have offered sim-
ilar opinions extrajudicially.14 1
138. The Court continually refers to this problem. See, for example, McCleskey v. Zant, 111
S. Ct. 1454, 1468 (1991) (stating that "[o]ne of the law's very objects is the finality of its judg-
ments"). The finality problem, however, is much more theoretical than real in light of recent deci-
sions limiting the circumstances under which a prisoner can come to a habeas court more than one
time. See id. at 1469 (stating that "abuse of the writ" by successive petitions is prohibited).
139. See McCleskey, 111 S. Ct. at 1469 (stating that "the power of a State to pass laws
means little if the State cannot enforce them").
140. See Ruth Marcus, On Death Row, How Many Appeals Are Enough?, Wash. Post, Al
(June 9, 1990) (repeating Chief Justice Rehnquist's complaints that capital crimes are handled
chaotically, "with ... seemingly endless rounds of eleventh-hour appeals"); Saundra Torry, Re-
tired Justice Powell: No Constitutional Right to Own Handguns, Wash. Post, A4 (Aug. 8, 1988)
(reporting that Justice Powell criticizes the "enormous delays between sentencing and execution"
with multiple habeas reviews available). See also Comment, The Reform of Federal Habeas
Corpus in Capital Cases, 29 Duquesne L. Rev. 61, 71 (1990) (quoting Justice Powell):
The hard fact is that the laws of 37 states are not being enforced by the courts. About 20,000
murders are committed in our country each year. Only a fraction of the worst murder-
ers-even those convicted-are sentenced to die. . . . [I]t seems irrational to retain the pen-
alty and frustrate its fair implementation.. . . Capital cases should be subject to one fair and
complete course of collateral review through the state and federal systems
(emphasis added) (citations omitted);
Robert Weisberg, A Great Writ While it Lasted, 81 J. Crim. L. & Criminol. 9 (1990) (speculating
that the decisions of Butler and Saffle were motivated by the Court's "frustrat[ion] with the inade-
quacy of the execution rate of America's death row inmates"). For an intriguing argument that
Teague should not apply to death cases, primarily because of the poor quality of counsel, see Dow,
19 Hastings Const. L. Q. 23 (cited in note 13).
141. See, for example, Al Kamen, Rehnquist Presses for Quicker Executions; Delay in Hear-
ings on Limiting Death Row Appeals is Opposed, Wash. Post, A17 (Oct. 13, 1989) (reporting that
in a letter to Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Joseph R. Biden, Chief Justice Rehnquist
urged Congress to clear up the "problem of delay and confusion in federal habeas corpus review of
state [death] sentences"); Ruth Marcus, Rehnquist Urges Limits on Death Row Appeals; Chief
Justice Attacks Sen. Biden's Alternative, Wash. Post, A17 (May 16, 1990) (reporting that in a
speech to the ALI, Rehnquist said that review of death sentences poses a "serious malfunction in
our legal system"); W. John Moore, Death Row Delays, 21 Nat'l J. 768 (1989) (reporting that in a
speech to the ABA, retired Justice Powell said the appeals process in death penalty cases has been
abused). Chief Justice Rehnquist's comments are particularly ironic in light of the fact that he
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Thus, this is a Court that was bound to see habeas as a problem. So
seeing, the Court took action. The Court ruled that habeas courts no
longer would devise new rights. Thus, finality concerns would be re-
duced by narrowing significantly the reach of the habeas writ.'
42
The problem with Teague is how the Court went about solving its
"problem" with the habeas courts. The Court has taken, and no doubt
will continue to take, a large number of criminal procedure cases in or-
der to scale back constitutional protections.'43 The Court also has de-
cided a number of cases that curtail repetitive review by habeas
courts.1 44 But in Teague the Court went one giant step further. Simply
put, Teague shuts down the habeas courts. Where once these courts
played an active, important role in defining the content of criminal pro-
cedure, they now can do little but patrol the perimeters of criminal con-
stitutional law.
Moreover, Teague slams shut the doors of the habeas court for a
good long time. The only way for the Court to "get around" Teague in
the future will be to overrule the decision. Many Supreme Court deci-
sions have tests that contain wiggle room to permit common-law evolu-
tion as circumstances change. Teague, however, fixes a firm barrier;
Teague redefines the purpose of habeas courts in a way that seemingly
will require flat-out repudiation to change. In the past, the Court has
shown a greater reluctance to overrule prior decisions, preferring merely
to work around them.
The dramatic impact of the Teague decision does not appear to be
an accident. The Teague Court suggested, with one incredibly telling
statement, that in its view the balance betweem crime control and con-
stitutional rights needed to be altered not only for this time but for the
future. In Teague, Justice O'Connor flatly stated that with regard to
the Teague exception for rights critical to the correct finding of guilt or
declined to express opinions on matters that could come before the Court when appearing before
Senate confirmation committees. See Nomination of Justice William Hubbs Rehnquist to be Chief
Justice of the United States: Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2nd
Sess. (1986). When asked a question about his dissenting opinion in Batson, Justice Rehnquist
refused to defend his position or delve into his reasoning behind his dissent. Id. at 359-61.
142. This is because not permitting "new" rules to apply on habeas would eliminate the rea-
son many habeas petitioners return to habeas courts. See, for example, Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 452,
461 (Burger concurring) (emphasizing the importance of the state's interest in finality and the
need to curb the "sporting contest" the writ has turned into). Simultaneously the Court has taken
action to eliminate the return of petitioners with claims that do not involve "new" rules but in-
volve other grounds for relief instead, such as claims that state officials hid evidence of miscon-
duct. See McCleskey, 111 S. Ct. at 1460 (dismissing a claim as abuse of the writ in which the
defendant alleged that the police "deliberately elicited" incriminating statements without the pres-
ence of counsel).
143. See note 134 and accompanying text.
144. See note 138 and accompanying text.
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innocence: "we believe it unlikely that many such components of basic
due process have yet to emerge.''141
What hubris!146 Here is a Court saying that further development of
constitutional rights in the area it believes to be the core element of fair
criminal procedure-the determination of guilt-is unlikely. Thus, the
Court limits the mechanism by which such rights might change and ex-
pand in the future. Moreover, if the Court believes the core of criminal
process is settled, one can only speculate that the Court believes further
development of rights it deems less worthy also is unlikely. The Teague
Court's hubris lies in its confidence that it has such a clear notion of the
correct meaning of criminal procedure rights that it not only can define
the meaning of those rights for the present, but also can put in place a
mechanism calculated to stunt the growth of those rights in the
future.'47
The Court seems to suggest that enlightenment has come upon us
and we need look no further. Yet recent history indicates that a court
which takes this stance ultimately will be embarrassed by its hubris.
The primary and most explicit statement from the Teague Court
relates to rights essential to the factfinding processes. One would expect
this because the Court has been moving in recent years toward a narrow
vision of the criminal justice system as directed only toward determin-
ing guilt and innocence of the accused. 14 8 This position seems to conflict
with the Constitution's text 149 and most of its history, but even if the
Court were correct in its premise, there is little reason to believe due
process has been defined fully in the factfinding, or guilt and innocence,
context.
Nevertheless, the Teague Court evidently believed we have found
the best way to get at the truth. According to the Court, it is unlikely
that the future will suggest to us any new means of more accurately
determining guilt or innocence. Thus, the judiciary need not seriously
145. Teague, 489 U.S. at 313.
146. Indeed, one might say, what chutzpah.
147. The phrase "stunt the growth" is Erwin Chemerinsky's. Indeed, I am indebted to Pro-
fessor Chemerinsky for helping me define with clarity the impact the Court's hubris will have on
its role in developing constitutional law in the future.
148. See, for example, Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1253 (1991) (holding that a
coerced confession can be harmless error); Kuhlmann 477 U.S. at 454 (requiring a "colorable show-
ing of factual innocence").
149. After all, many provisions of the Bill of Rights have little to do with the guilt/innocence
determination. Most noteworthy is the Fourth Amendment, which, if enforced, actually stands in
the way of an "accurate" assessment of guilt. Not surprisingly, the Fourth Amendment has borne
the brunt of the Court's attack on criminal constitutional rights. See, for example, Acevedo, 111 S.
Ct. at 1991 (permitting the search of a container in a car without a warrant); Riverside, ill S. Ct.
at 1668 (allowing detention pending a probable cause hearing); Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2388 (finding
that a police search of a boarded bus does not necessarily constitute a seizure).
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trouble itself with the possibility of an expansion of constitutional
rights in this area. 5 '
The Teague Court need not have looked back very far, however, in
order to get an idea of how quickly it might regret this vision. The
Court might have pointed to Gideon v. Wainwright'5' as the prototypi-
cal decision concerned with ensuring the accuracy of factfinding.' 52 But
a mere twenty years before Gideon mandated that indigent defendants
be provided with counsel to ensure a fair trial, a predecessor Court took
the opposite position. In Betts v. Brady the Court stated there was
nothing fundamental about the right to counsel.153 Yet the Betts Court
undoubtedly believed itself every bit as enlightened as the Gideon
Court.
Since Gideon the Court has continued to expand rights critical to
the accuracy of the factfinding. For example, it was not until some
seven years ago, in Ake v. Oklahoma T15  that the Court first recognized
that an indigent defendant might require state-provided expert assis-
tance to get at the truth.155 And less than fifteen years ago, in Sand-
strom v. Montana, 56  the Court prohibited burden-shifting
instructions.' 57
Reconstructing past events is a tricky business, but the technology
for doing so is evolving rapidly. Hypnosis and DNA testing are in their
infancy.'5 8 Just as fingerprinting did in its infancy, these techniques
surely will present difficult due process questions, as will videotape, in-
cident reconstruction, and breathalyzers. Yet, the Teague Court seems
content to ignore the possibility that the meaning of due process may
150. A more mean-spirited interpretation would be that whether or not we discover more
accurate ways of determing guilt or innocence, the Court simply does not care whether future
criminal defendants obtain such a fair process.
151. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
152. The Court in fact points to "the classic grounds for the issuance of writ of habeas
corpus-that the proceeding was dominated by mob violence; that the prosecutor knowingly made
use of perjured testimony; or that the conviction was based on a confession extorted from the
defendant by brutal methods." Teague, 489 U.S. at 313 (citations omitted).
153. 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942).
154. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
155. Id. at 83. Lower courts have been probing Ake's application in specific situations beyond
the facts of Ake. See, for example, Little v. Armontrout, 835 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding
that Ake extends to nonpsychiatric experts). Query whether this comes to a stop because all such
decisions are "new rules."
156. 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
157. Id. at 524.
158. Compare Burns v. Reed, 111 S. Ct. 1934, 1939-44 (1991) (discussing prosecutorial immu-
nity in the context of a case in which a state judge held that obtaining hypnotic testimony violated
the Constitution). On the use of DNA testing in criminal trials, see Richard Lempert, Some Cave-
ats Concerning DNA as Criminal Identification Evidence: With Thanks to the Reverend Bayes,
13 Cardozo L. Rev. 303 (1991).
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evolve with technological and epistemological advances. Thus, the
Teague Court was willing to quiet the voice of the habeas courts in
which the need for such new rights frequently becomes evident.
The Court's hubris is equally troubling with regard to rights not
implicated in the factfinding process. There are many rights which pro-
vide credibility and dignity to the criminal justice system. It is no acci-
dent that these rights are imbedded in the Constitution. They preserve
the legitimacy of the entire process. Yet they may have little or nothing
to do with the accurate finding of guilt or innocence.
Batson v. Kentucky makes clear just how problematic is the
Court's refusal to accept the continued development of these nonguilt
related rights. A mere twenty years before Batson, the Court decided
Swain, which foreclosed any equal protection challenge to the prosecu-
tor's racially discriminatory use of peremptory strikes of potential ju-
rors. But in Batson the Court rejected its position in Swain and
recognized that our society could not stomach a criminal process which
systematically barred blacks from participating as jurors. Interestingly,
Batson was not the brainchild of a liberal Warren Court. Batson was
decided in 1987 by the Burger Court, and it was strongly reaffirmed
recently by the Rehnquist Court.
Nor is Batson, with its condemnation of pervasive racial prejudice,
the only case of recent vintage recognizing a nonfactfinding related
right. Indeed, it may be difficult to tell the difference between those
rights that relate to factfinding and those that do not. Within the last
ten years, the Court recognized that prosecutors should not be able to
alleviate the responsibility of capital sentencing juries by convincing
them that the ultimate decision as to life or death would rest some-
where else.159
These decisions are important proof that due process is an evolving
concept, not a static one. These decisions suggest that although the
Court thinks that we have reached the limits of the constitutional guar-
antees,160 one properly may doubt this. Similarly the Court seems to
think that the evolution of due process does not require the participa-
tion of the habeas courts. But the limitations of the Supreme Court's
docket suggest otherwise.' 6'
159. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 328-29 (1985). For further discussion of the evolu-
tion of rights and the impact of Teague, see Wilson, 16 S. U. L. Rev. at 17-19 (cited in note 13).
160. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 313 (stating that "we believe it unlikely that many such compo-
nents of basic due process have yet to emerge") (plurality opinion).
161. See generally Samuel Estreicher and John E. Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the Su-
preme Court's Responsibilities: An Empirical Study, 59 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 681 (1984).
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V. WHAT COMES OF HUBRIS
Everyone knows what comes of hubris in the world of litera-
ture-the hubristic fall.162 The questions then become whether this fate
is also inevitable in the legal world, and if so, what will cause the
Court's fall, and what form will it take?
While possible, it is unlikely that the Court's "fall" will be precipi-
tated by Congress. Congress certainly could use its control over the ju-
risdiction of the federal courts to give back what the Teague Court has
taken away. Congress could revise the habeas statute in some way that
would put the habeas courts back in business. It is unrealistic, however,
to expect Congress to brave the political waters that would be necessary
to overcome Teague. The Teague decision, as unfortunate as it is,
largely is a product of a society extremely concerned about crime and
hostile to the rights of criminal defendants. 16 3 If the Court was so
swayed, it is unlikely that Congress will act differently. In fact, recent
maneuvering on the crime bill and its habeas provisions suggest Con-
gress will not soon take any action to overrule Teague.'
Moreover, even if Congress did speak there is little reason to sus-
pect that the Court would honor Congress' commands. As I have docu-
mented elsewhere, contrary to the traditional view that Congress
controls the jurisdiction of the habeas courts, the Court unquestionably
has been the leading partner in defining the scope of habeas jurisdic-
tion. '165 The Court has twisted more than one statutory phrase to define
162. Actually, this itself is a tricky question, for what we all know may actually be incorrect.
I was taught that hubris meant "overweening pride" and was a fatal flaw common in many of the
classical Greek works. But I thank Professor Bill Race for setting me straight. There is some de-
bate in the academy as to where exactly this commonly-held notion of hubris comes from, but it
does not come from Greek literature. See Richmond Lattimore, Story Patterns in Greek Tragedy
at 23-27 (U. of Mich., 1964). See also D.M. MacDowell, HYBRIS in Athens, 23 Greece & Rome 14,
14-31 (1976); N.R.E. Fisher, HYBRIS and Dishonor: I, 23 Greece & Rome 177 (1976). More likely,
this sense of hubris is a creation of our far more recent Judeo-Christian tradition.
163. The Rehnquist Court is comprised largely of members appointed by presidents who
have made crime control a major plank in their platforms. See, for example, Jonathan Kaufman,
Crime Pays as an Issue for GOP; Republicans Talk Tough While Democrats Dither, Boston
Globe, Focus 75 (May 21, 1989) (stating that President Bush intended to focus on crime and crimi-
nal defendants by providing more federal agents, more prisons, and tougher sentencing); Now the
Red Flag of Racism Has Been Unfurled, Chi. Trib., Perspective, 23 (Oct. 26, 1988) (noting that
President Bush had two running mates-Dan Quayle and Willie Horton (a Massachusetts mur-
derer and rapist)); Stuart K. Spencer, If Economy is the Issue, GOP Chances Looking Up, L.A.
Times, Opinion, pt. 5, at 3, col. 1 (Jan. 17, 1988) (stating that President Reagan emphasized crime
control and provictim defense in his policy choices); Dabid Lauter, Crime Issues Becoming Elec-
tion Battleground; Dukakis Camp Determined to Counter Bush's Attack on Death Penalty,
Pri.on-Furlough Stands, L.A. Times, pt. 1, at 1, col. 4 (June 13, 1988) (noting that President
Nixon ran as a "law and order" candidate in 1968).
164. See Violent Crime Control Act of 1991, S. 1241, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). See gen-
erally Berger, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1665 (cited in note 13) (discussing legislative habeas proposals).
165. See Friedman, 85 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 13 (cited in note 10).
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habeas as it wishes. 6' Although a relatively clear statute might con-
strain the Court, it is difficult to imagine firm guidance from Congress
actually forcing the Court to toe the statutory line.
Nor is the fall likely to be instigated by the body politic any time
soon. Political clamoring for strong anticrime measures appears to re-
flect deep societal concern about crime, and particularly about drugs
and crime. Although societal outrage at the recent beating of a Los An-
geles citizen, captured on videotape by a bystander, suggests a public
tolerance threshold for crime control methods,'16 it also suggests that
with regard to the criminal justice system out of sight tends to mean
out of mind. The simple fact remains that the public's concern about
crime, as communicated to its representatives, reveals that the balance
has been struck in favor of crime control over protection of constitu-
tional rights.
In literature, the fall is precipitated by the protagonist's own ac-
tions, a product of her own hubris. Thus, despite the blessings of Con-
gress and the general public, the Teague Court likewise may be fatally
flawed and may yet do injury to itself and the federal judiciary. The fall
will not occur any time soon, but Teague ultimately may do great harm
to the Court as an institution. 68
Although the role of the federal courts in protecting individual
rights has been evolutionary, that role is fairly well ensconced at pre-
sent. The general perception of the Supreme Court and the federal
courts is that of an institution whose role it is to protect minority rights
against majority actions. Certainly the Court has built its stock on play-
ing this role, on acting as a counterweight to the decisions and actions
of the political branches.
Teague, in word and effect, runs the risk of undermining this capi-
tal not only for the present, but also for the future when the capital
may well be needed. Teague signals the federal courts' retreat from the
position of defender of individual rights. Teague tells us we have
enough rights'69 and thus withdraws the lower federal courts from the
mission of protecting and defining those rights.
Indeed, in its zeal to restrict habeas, the Court has declared open
166. See, for example, id. at 10-20.
167. See The Christopher Commission on Tuesday Issued a 228-Page Report on the Activi-
ties of Los Angeles Police Department. Here are Excerpts:, L.A. Times, July 10, 1991, pt. A, at 12,
col. 1 (detailing how the King beating provoked public outcry against police brutality); Jesse Katz,
King Beating Makes Police's Job Harder, L.A. Times, Apr. 7, 1991, pt. J, at 1, col. 2 (stating that
youths now follow police with video cameras); Cecilia Rasmussen, Crisis in the LAPD: The Rodney
King Case, L.A. Times, Apr. 5, 1991, pt. B, at 2, col. 3 (listing supporters and nonsup-
porters-those who want his resignation-of Los Angeles Police Chief Gates).
168. I thank Erwin Chemerinsky for suggesting this.
169. See note 146 and accompanying text.
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season on federal jurisdiction. Congress, with unabashed encouragement
from Chief Justice Rehnquist, now vociferously has joined the fray,
passing measures draconian in their curtailment of habeas jurisdic-
tion. 1 7 In its hubris the Court has failed to think of itself as an institu-
tion, whose needs in the future might differ from temporal preferences.
Carried away with its own zeal to implement current preferences, the
Court lost the foresight it needed to make prudent jurisdictional
decisions.
For this reason Teague stands in sharp contrast to another juris-
dictional decision outside the habeas context, Webster v. Doe,'7 1 in
which foresight appears to have triumphed over passing preference.
The issue in Webster was whether federal courts have jurisdiction to
review the decisions of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
to dismiss employees. An employee alleged that the Director violated
numerous statutory and constitutional rights by dismissing him shortly
after he disclosed his homosexuality. Although the Court held that Con-
gress intended to preclude judicial review of the CIA Director's actions
on statutory grounds, the Court carefully protected its right to review
constitutional claims.7 2 The decision was remarkable in this regard be-
cause the very same statutory language that deprived the Court of juris-
diction to review statutory claims appeared to deprive it of jurisdiction
to review constitutional claims as well. 173 Nonetheless, the Court as-
serted that any congressional attempt to remove jurisdiction over con-
stitutional claims would itself raise "serious constititional question[s]"
about the separation of power and the role of the Court. 74 As a result,
the Court refused to attribute to Congress any intent to preclude review
of constitutional claims. 17 5
I do not mean to equate the circumstances of Webster and Teague.
With regard to maintaining judicial supremacy, there is some difference
between refusing to acquiesce in a congressional removal of jurisdiction
and establishing a judicial limitation. The difficulty with Teague is that
the difference is not as great as it looks.
The Webster Court, and Justice Rehnquist writing for the major-
ity, does not appear to be any more sympathetic to the claims of gay
people than it is to the claims of criminal defendants. The widely con-
demned decision in Bowers v. Hardwick displays the Court's lack of
170. See note 164.
171. 486 U.S. 592 (1988).
172. Id. at 603-04.
173. See Friedman, 85 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 57 n.263 (cited in note 10) (noting that despite this
apparent preclusion, "the Court consistently finds a gap that permits constitutional review").
174. Webster, 486 U.S. at 603.
175. Id.
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sensitivity to the circumstances of gay individuals and the lack of con-
cern for their rights.176
In Webster, however, despite its lack of sensitivity for the plaintiff,
the Court saw beyond the circumstances of the specific case to the im-
plications for the Court's institutional role. Whether the Court cared or
not about Doe, the Court was concerned about a precedent that cur-
tailed its ability to hear constitutional claims. In order to preserve that
power, the Court ruled in Doe's favor.
The Court did not display such foresight in Teague. Particularly in
the last few years the Court repeatedly has exposed its hostility to crim-
inal defendants and its eagerness to see that habeas corpus not stand in
the way of the death penalty. 7 ' Blinded by these concerns, the Teague
Court lost sight of any possibility that habeas jurisdiction, jealously cul-
tivated for many years, might again be of any importance. Under the
circumstances in which it wrote, habeas was but a nuisance, expanding
the rights of criminals and providing repetitive review.
Those circumstances might change. If history is any guide, they al-
most certainly will. And where then will be the habeas courts, which
may have inspired anger but also wielded important power? If the
Court's recent shortsighted opinions in Teague and other habeas deci-
sions are any indication, the habeas courts will be dark, with an "out of
business" sign hanging in the front. This, then, will be the legacy of the
Rehnquist Court for future Courts and federal jurisdiction.
176. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). See Anne B. Goldstein, History, Homosexuality, and Political Val-
ues: Searching for the Hidden Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 Yale L. J. 1073, 1087
(1988) (criticizing the closemindedness of the Court and noting that" 'homosexuality' is a cultural
and historical artifact"); Janet Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for
Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. Rev. 915, 916-18 (1989) (arguing that the courts,
under "the mandate of the equal protection clause," are obliged to protect "the despised minor-
ity"); Comment, The Louisiana Constitution's Declaration of Rights: Post Hardwick Protection
for Sexual Privacy?, 62 Tulane L. Rev. 767, 768 n.3 (1988) (stating that" 'homophobia rather than
law seems to have controlled decisions in the court'" (citations omitted)).
177. See note 140.
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